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African Americans
and the
Persian Gulf Crisis

percent by August 1950 with onl) 20
it

was

certain that

a mistake-.

By 1951, however,
American presence

onl)

18

perceni believed the

Korea was not a mistake whilf
it
was. During the Eisenhowei and
Kennedy years. Americans did not seem to be aware ol
the gradual increase in military presence in South
Vietnam; by 1965. support for Lyndon Johnson's plans to
in

percent believed

by

intervene in South Vietnam reached roughly 65 percent
with a two-to-one margin of support lor his decisions

Jacqueline Howard-Matthews

From 1966

This article addresses two issues: the AfricanAmerican response to United States involvement in the
1990-91 Persian Gulf war and interrelated factors
explaining the nature of that response. Despite the
historical symbolism associated with African-American

1967. less than 40 percent of those

to early

polled characterized U.S. intervention as

a

mistake.

although 37 percent disapproved of Johnson's
management and 41 percent approved. By April 1968.
the public's wariness with sustained yet murky signs of
victory became evident. After the Tet offensive and the
1

and disproportionate representation in the
military, African Americans composed the most
consistently identifiable strata either opposed to or
suspicious of the deployment of U.S. troops and military
equipment in the Gulf. The pattern of African-American
response to the Gulf War is remarkably similar to its

participation

Pueblo incident, approval of the U.S. presence in Vietnam
dropped to 35 percent. On November 3, 1969. Richard
Nixon called for the "Vietnamization" of the war;
although 55 percent of the public described itself as

"doves" and only 31 percent as "hawks," he received
generally high approval (67 percent) and conduct of the
war (64 percent) ratings. After the invasion of Laos.
Nixon suffered a 7 percent decline in approval with the

underlying reactions to military conflicts taking place in
the recent past, including the Vietnam War and Laos

invasion of the 1960s and 1970s. The weight of the
evidence suggests African-American public opinion
during the Gulf War was not simply part and parcel of a
growing national isolationism. Rather, it reflects African
America's level of political dissent, tolerance, and anti-

majority

now

disapproving of his handling of the war.

By

1971, 61 percent of the public described the entanglement

of U.S. troops in Vietnam as a mistake.

The response

imperialism.

Mayaguez
to United

to

Gerald Ford's decision

in

the

Jimmy Carter's handling of the
U.S. embassy in Teheran and Soviet

incident and

takeover of the

The African-American Response

paced

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 followed the pattern of

States Involvement in the Persian Gulf Crisis
When the Bush administration deployed the first U.S.
troops and equipment to Saudi Arabia on August 8, 1990,
the weight of history gave it every reason to assume that
the public would overwhelmingly support its response to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. If the Gulf War ended quickly
with relatively few American casualties, the Bush
administration hoped it would be rewarded by a sorely
needed increase in its public approval rating, possibly one

overwhelming and later waning support for foreign
military action. Ronald Reagan's reaction to the October
1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy, which resulted in the
death of 241 U.S. citizens, is perhaps one model of how
the government might override and benefit from the

upcoming

without significant domestic hardship. Conflict analysis

the pattern of

could be propagandized to favor the government in its
management of international affairs during this period.
Reagan's approval rating for the period was a resounding

strong enough to decisively influence the
elections. Since the

end of World War

II,

first

transient nature of public support for

59 percent. And

George Bush's
order to invade Panama in 1989 reached 80 percent and
influenced the increase in the approval rating for his
overall Central American policy (66 percent). However,
by 1990, the rising cost of the war and problems occurring
in the trial against Manuel Noriega returned his Central
American approval ratings back to 42 percent.

domestic socioeconomic hardship associated with the war

appears to be irremediable, gradual doubt over the
wisdom of the government's action and frustration replace
optimism and exuberant loyalty. Finally, with failure to
quickly resolve the conflict, the plurality of public opinion

pessimism with both

Using examples over a forty-year period, from 1950 to
1990, the above observation sheds light on the pattern of
majority-response to foreign military involvement and its

communism,

The

last,

the approval rating of

Three days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the majority of
U.S. public opinion expressed limited support for U.S.
4
actions conveying opposition to the invasion. Under

military involvement and the president in power.

transitory nature.

conflict.

Three days after the bombing and before the public
reaction could be recorded, Reagan announced the
invasion of Grenada. The victory occurred swiftly and

Americans' response to U.S. military involvement is one
of sustained support in the early- to mid-stages of the
conflict. However, as the toll of the combat dead rises and

registers high disapproval and

armed

specific conditions

hysteria surrounding the fear of

Iraq, for

—

example, or

if

U.S. citizens became hostages of

if

Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia

—those

individuals polled said they would advise direct military

blind loyalty to the publicly stated goals of

U.S. foreign policy, and national bravado combined to
give U.S. involvement in Korea an approval rating of 65

intervention.

The majority of those polled

economic sanctions against Iraq and

27

if

also called for

a gasoline shortage

were

to result

from

Iraq's actions, they

a military response.

viewed the war

The

Americans as a whole continued to
approve of some form of action, more than any other

would recommend

In short, while

fact that two-thirds of the public

racial group, African

as inevitable suggests that, regardless of

the conditions, the public

was preparing

U.S. military policy during the early stages of war.

itself for direct

By November

military involvement.

When

invaded Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait, slight differences
slowly emerged in the answers of whites (f:61; o:25) and

An even more

—

detailed set of

questions revealed a decided racial difference of opinion
(see Table

1). First,

1990, the difference in public opinion

between the races expanded significantly. Nationally, 65
percent of the citizenry supported the initial
announcement of troops being deployed to the Gulf as a
means of blocking an anticipated Iraqi assault against
Saudi Arabia. 5 Yet, only 47 percent approved of sending
another round of troops, which was upwards of 150,000
(see Table 3). Two questions measuring reaction to troop
build-up and the use of war as the primary tool for
conflict resolution confirmed that the vast majority of
blacks polled
at least 70 percent
very strongly
opposed U.S. military decisions strengthening the

by race, a specific
racial division of opinion appears to have existed from the
very beginning of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.
When asked if they favored (f) or opposed (o) direct U.S.
military involvement against Iraq, the percentage of
answers supplied by whites (f:23; o:69) and blacks (f:23;
o:70) were similar as of August 4. When asked if Iraq
the answers are disaggregated

blacks (f:57; o:27).

Americans recorded disfavor with

African- American response to the

—

likelihood of direct, retaliatory action against Iraq.

month

administration's policies did not follow the overall

One

national pattern of staggering, clear-cut support. Second,

an ambivalent national public had evolved
with approval for initial U.S. troop assembling but no

when compared

consensus on the next steps. 6 For 45 percent of the public,

to sanction

to whites, blacks

were

far

more

reticent

any form of U.S. aggressive response.

Table
Question:

1:

Would you favor

later,

Possible U.S. Responses to Iraq Invasion of
i

Ban

Iraqi Imports

Oppose No Op.

Favor

Oppose No Op.

National

80

10

10

72

17

Race
White

83

9

8

74

67

17

16

68

21

11

U.S.

Navy

to

Gulf

Oppose No Op.

11

68

22

10

16

10

71

9

55

25

20

45

63

24

13

62

20
39
27

16
11

Favor

Oppose No Op.

Send U.S. ground troops
Favor Oppose No Op.

National

31

57

12

32

56

12

76

13

11

Race
White

33

55

12

32

56

12

11

10

27

63

10

61

11

23

18

25

71

4

28
47

79
59
70

17

13

Black
Other

Military Targets

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly, August 1990, 4-5 Note:

44
9
=
"No Op" no opinion.

Following earlier response patterns, after Bush

displeasure with heightened U.S. military action than did

While Bush's ratings points

among whites (29
percent, -5 percent) questioned from August 3-4 to
(approval, disapproval) improved

August 9-12, black support for his handling of the crisis
increased by only 21 points while dissatisfaction
increased 7 points. Although African Americans'
approval ratings never fell to the August 3-4 level,

management of

Favor

Oppose No Op.

With the exception of blacks, there was an almost
equal amount of ambiguity and very little consensus
among the races. Of those polled, 49 percent of whites
found that the situation was worth a war, while 42 did not;
45 percent of the races identified as "other" advocated
war and 51 opposed it. For blacks, who showed the lowest
support for war and the highest resistance to it, the
percentages were 32 and 63, respectively. By early
December, Saddam Hussein began to hint that he might
authorize the release of foreign hostages, which he failed
to do in the weeks to come. Partly in response to
Hussein's behavior and to the media campaigns of the
Bush administration, public opinion swung more in favor
percent.

government's handling of Gulf-related issues (see Table
2). However, blacks progressively revealed more doubt or

disapproval of his

Allied Oil Boycott

not merit a U.S. declaration of war; they did for 47

deployed troops and equipment on August 8, both whites
and blacks registered a higher approval rating of the

the nation as a whole.

%)

Favor
-

Gulf did

Kuwait

.

Favor

Bomb

in the

or oppose the following actions the U.S has taken or could take? (answer in

Freeze Kuwaiti Assets

Black
Other

from roughly 120 days

the issues arising

the crisis steadily rose.
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of the decisions of the White House by mid-December. In
keeping with what was by now an established, racially

African-American

institutions, the activities of black

elected officials and national organizations reveal a degree

based opinion discontinuity, while the national average
was 63 percent approving and 30 percent disapproving,

of opposition to official U.S. policy

black response was 34 and 59 percent, respectively.
An opinion poll conducted between December 6 and 9
clarified the basis of African-American disapproval with

involvement

the course of action in the Gulf. 7

Of

Question:

Do you

Changes

in

Gull

crisis.

In

the Gulf, prior to direct military

against U.S. policy.

Once

number

ol

issues

the United States initiated the

bombing of Iraq, however, many critics felt compelled to
cease their vocal opposition. Surprisingly, to some
observers, a decisive number of black congressional

four possible actions

69 percent of the African Americans asked
sought a nonmilitary resolution to the Gulf crisis, 19

2:

in

intervention, critics effectively raised a

for the nation,

Table

in the

the case of congressional debates on the issue of U.S.

Bush's Middle East Approval During August

approve or disapprove of the way George Bush

is

handling

this current situation in the

Middle East

involving Iraq and Kuwait?

August 3-4

National

Race
White
Black
Other

August 9-12

August 16-19

August 23-26

A

D

NO

A

D

NO

A

D

NO

A

D

NO

52

16

32

80

12

8

79

14

7

76

17

7

53
41

15

32

82

10

8

82

12

6

78

14

8

21

62
77

10

7

6

28

6

56
70

36
23

6

17

60
66

33

23

38
28

28

49

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly, August 1990, 22-23. Note: "A," "D," and

"NO"

7

are abbreviations for approval, disapproval

and no

opinion respectively.

percent favored withdrawal and 50 percent were for
sanctions
only 28 percent wanted war. Whites were split
(49 percent and 48 percent) between a nonmilitary

members did not succumb to the notion, "when at war,
loyalty to the flag." The oppositional consistency of

reaction and war; 57 percent of other races favored

waning of

peaceful means with only 39 percent ready to use force.

Although the majority of blacks in
Congress are active in the Democratic party and loyal to
the party line, many of them participated in antiwar
rallies. They became some of the most outspoken critics
of U.S. policy, even after the House of Representatives
(250 to 183) and the Senate (52 to 47) voted in favor of
8
the White House policy. Included among these outspoken
members of Congress were Ron Dellums (California),
John Lewis (Georgia), Charles Rangel (New York), John
Conyers (Michigan), and Cardiss Collins (Illinois).
There were two major antiwar groups, the National
Coalition to Stop U.S. Intervention in the Middle East and
the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East. The
former refused to denounce the Iraqi invasion, opposed
sanctions against Iraq, and included in its organizational
membership the Palestine Solidarity Committee. It was led
by Dick Gregory and former U.S. Attorney General
Ramsey Clark. The latter group, representing mainstream
antiwar groups, denounced the invasion and supported the
United Nations sanctions against Iraq. Of the two groups,
black veterans committees formed to oppose the war,
community development groups, and students

—

African-American representatives
policy

Almost six weeks after this survey, the United States led a
high-tech allied force against Iraq, televised
internationally.

The results of these polls did not surprise too many
African Americans. As several commentators in
Washington, D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts, observed
after the resolution of the

immediate

crisis in the Gulf,

during the media blitz of the war, almost

all that one could
hear in black-owned establishments
barber shops,
churches, restaurants, and cleaners
was criticism of the
official policy in the Gulf and expressions of sorrow that
lives on both sides would be lost. The vigorous debates
waged in the historically black colleges particularly
those in the Clark Atlanta University Complex
and
campus demonstrations were equally informative. The
bluster and almost hysterical demand for military
retribution against Iraq that characterized the media

—

—

—

—

coverage of public opinion was simply not a consistently
recognizable position in the black community. This is

even more remarkable given that many African
Americans realized their sons and daughters would

is

in the

Congress and the

their colleagues' critical attacks against the

instructive.

on

historically black college

comprise a sizeable contingent in the U.S. military in the
Middle East and also might have clearly doubted the

orchestrating demonstrations

appropriateness of Iraq's invasion.

Coalition. In addition, as the immensity of the

campuses were more prone

to affiliate

with the National

bombings

became increasingly evident, national black

In addition to discussions in local neighborhoods and

29

leaders,

including Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference and Ben Chavis met with the aim
of demanding an immediate cease-fire and reevaluation of
the agenda of the American-led forces. More than fifty
leaders attended the last such meeting in New York, a few
days before Iraq met the stipulations of the United Nations
resolution on the removal of its military from Kuwait.
What about African-American opinion after Baghdad
agreed to the terms outlined by George Bush and the
United Nations and the return home of most of the U.S.
troops? The approximate number of U.S. soldiers deployed
in the Persian Gulf was at least 250,000 between August

leaders and organizations, and the level of doubt voiced

blacks in their communities speak for themselves.

and Anti-imperialism
as Factors Influencing African- American
Response to the Gulf War
Political Tolerance

Unraveling the complexity of the relationship between

African Americans and the military reveals that the
objective of equal opportunity in the military and overall
full citizenship between the 1700s and 1960 and
disproportionate representation in the military from 1965
to 1992 do not fully define the parameters of African
America's world view. Although not a part of an historical
viewpoint that is emphasized today, it is clear that while
some African Americans fought bravely as Buffalo
Soldiers on behalf of the state, a smaller minority
physically opposed the government by participating in
wars, for example, on the side of the Indians during the
Seminole Wars and Indian campaigns, and as militants
during the Spanish-American War. Many more opposed
U.S. participation in World War II and the Vietnam War.
Questioning state propaganda, therefore, is not without
historical basis. If there were no such basis for dissent
and suspicion stemming from racial oppression,
disproportionate representation in the military, and fear of
appearing to be disloyal to the nation, African Americans
might be compelled to be less independent in their

1990 and July 1992. The death toll amounted to 268, of
which 158 died in combat, and the number of wounded
reached 458 men and women. Following the national
public opinion pattern described previously, a war or any

form of military conflict generating a low death

toll in

combat and implemented swiftly would garner
widespread support. Yet, as the racial opinion dichotomy
has evolved since the views of African Americans and
other races have been taken into consideration, African

Americans are
fall in line

policy.

far

more suspicious of and

less likely to

with publicly stated U.S. foreign military

True to form, almost

declared on April 6, 1991,
Persian Gulf was worth

it,

six

weeks

after the cease-fire

when asked

if

the

war

in the

the national pattern and racial

configuration remained constant (see Table 4).

Based on media coverage,
African Americans had

little

it

is

easy to surmise that

analyses.

A

to say about the presence of the

United States in the Persian Gulf. The exception would have

brief review of public opinion associated with

contemporary threads of

critical thinking

3:

major

military conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s emphasizes
strong,

Table

by

Public Opinion Regarding Troop Buildup and Going to

War

which

in their

appearance are decidedly

anti-

imperialist within the context of

Question:

Do you

approve or disapprove of the President's decision

additional 150,000 troops to the Middle East? (answers in

Approve Buildup?

Initiate

Approve

Disapprove

47

46

No

Op.

to

send an

U.S. political culture. From
1960 to 1975, even as citizens
labeled the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam a blunder, they could

%)
War?

Favor

Oppose

No

37

51

12

Op.

neither pardon draft resisters

complete
withdrawal. Racial breakdown

nor
National

Race
White
Black
Other

7

of

demonstrates a specific pattern

42
78
54

51

20
40

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly,

7

38

2

24
36

6

November

directly or indirectly

knew

a black

man

or

woman

stationed

in the Gulf. In the first four demonstrations in Boston, for

example, African Americans comprised
of the marchers. In

New

less than 15 percent

Orleans, black participation in

antiwar marches amounted to less than 20 percent.
examination of the racial composition of

sit-ins

An

and mass

disobedience activities would reveal similar,

if

49
70

13

to this ambiguity, with blacks

6

58

6

disassociated from positions
suggesting strident levels of

unwillingness to condemn
government policy.
In the early 1970s, the
majority of citizens believed it was a mistake for the nation
to become involved in Vietnam with black opinion
fluctuating between 58 and 71 percent and white opinion
9
in the 50 to 59 percent range. Admitting the mistake,
however, did not necessarily mean that Americans were
willing to condone draft evasion, with which they
continued to find fault during the Vietnam War and even a

1990, 16.

been the ever-present media interview of a person who

civil

approve

year after the signing of the peace accord. In

not

May

1970,

Americans were asked to determine the penalty for draft
evaders. At this time, the percentage of black casualties
appeared to be abnormally high and blacks complained

lower, figures. In the final analysis, one might conclude that

African America did not respond. Yet, the consistency of
public opinion polls, the activities of African-American

30

many

of them were assigned to frontline
combat. Yet, they were decidedly reluctant to advise the
that far too

assert that political partisanship

explanatory variable, which conveniently allows verj
comfortable labeling of responses on the basis of "hawks"

harshest possible punishment against draft resisters and
were almost evenly divided on sending them to Vietnam in

and "doves,"

and conservati\es Indeed, in the
1960s and in 1992, this was assuredly the case. Toda) it is
fashionable to say that demands tor concentrating on
domestic rather than foreign affairs are indicative of a

a noncombat capacity or applying no penalty at all. White
public opinion, on the other hand, strongly advised some

form of punishment with preference

for

noncombat duty

the overarching

is

in

liberals

Vietnam.

"return" to isolationism. Certainly, the vast majority ol

Four years later, a majority of Americans opposed
unconditional amnesty, although only 8 percent
recommended imprisonment or fines. Both whites (63

Americans demand
domestic

affairs.

After

that the
all.

government attend

to

few would argue against the

assertion that long-term, failed state policies are the

percent) and blacks (72 percent) interpreted opposition to

foundation of the nation's immediate crises. Those
African Americans who consistently supported U.S.
involvement in the Gulf most definitely realized that

on moral objections, as opposed
to a total rejection of the nation. 10 While 50 percent of
blacks would have allowed draft resisters to return to the
United States without punishment and 36 percent would
the draft as being based

protecting the nation's vital interest at a cost of well over

$2 million exacerbated already

budgetary

tight

not, the majority of whites (62 to 31 percent) favored

some form of castigation upon return.
In terms of deploying either troops or arms and
materials in military conflicts, Americans were more
likely to agree to the latter but with opinion split on
withdrawal." The decision appears to have been based on

Table

concern for the lives of U.S. troops. A closer inspection
reveals that blacks cautioned against deployment of troops
in

Cambodia and Laos

Was

Persian Gulf:

It

Worth

was the current situation
Mideast worth going to war over, or not.
Question: All in

(answer

and, in the case of Vietnam,

supported withdrawal. African Americans consistently
registered reluctance to send U.S. troops (76 percent) and
equipment (55 percent) to Cambodia in 1970 with

lukewarm support

4:

deployment of soldiers (13
percent) and arms (24 percent). While national and white
opinions opposed increased troop involvement (59
percent), they favored supplying arms and materials to
Cambodia (55 percent to 33 percent, respectively).
By March 1971, Americans viewed the invasion of
Laos as a measure destined to extend the Vietnam War
and therefore did not support Nixon's plan to place
barricades along the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a way of
shoring up South Vietnam. While the national consensus
to return troops by the end of 1971 was a resoundingly
for the

in

all,

It?

in the

%)
Yes

No

No

National

72

23

5

Race
White
Black

74
46

21

5

6

Other

68

48
26

opinion

6

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly, June 1991, 50.

constraints.

They were undoubtedly cognizant of

the

clear 71 percent with 21 percent opposed, black support

innumerable problems faced by their

own communities

for withdrawal reached 81 percent with 12 percent

and the failure of the government

to

against.

More

12

adequately. For that reason, the vast majority of African

Americans

than twenty years after the Vietnam War, blacks

and whites still disagree on significant
the gap is closing with both holding on
the United States erred in

address them

its

view

decision to enter the

of citizens clamoring for resolution of socioeconomic

that

war

problems because of being "especially hard hit by the
recessionary times." Were redress of domestic socioeconomic problems the only pressing concerns of African
Americans, 64 percent of them would not have veered
from the thrust of so-called isolationism today. That 64
percent comprises the dominant force for ending anti-

in

11

Vietnam and questioning the long-term, positive
consequences of the war. In terms of opinions on war and
deterrence, neither whites nor blacks have arrived at
internal consensus over the use of war as a way of
resolving conflict. The wider implications of these

imperialist, military excursions abroad

shown in Table 5 is that in the
future, when compared to whites, blacks will most
probably not easily and immediately accept the
government's Communist scare argument as an
differences in opinion

is

acting within

national ideological view. Unlike others, whatever false

consciousness regarding national loyalty this group
possesses, in times of war and peace, it does not allow
itself to be barred from questioning the rationale behind
military policy abroad and interjecting warnings against

likely than whites to continue to support early withdrawal.
all

and

the tradition of political dissent challenging the prevailing

explanation for involving the U.S. military in foreign
wars. If military involvement does occur, blacks are more
Explanations of opinion

some form of redress.

African Americans are not simply a sizeable percentage

issues, although
to the

are urgently seeking

too frequently and easily

injudicious action.
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Table

5:

Mistakes in Vietnam

Questions: Looking back, do you think the U.S.

made

a mistake sending troops to

Vietnam? Some people say that the U.S. should have cut its losses by
accepting a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam much earlier. Others say the U.S.
should have made an even greater military effort to try to win a victory there. Which
comes closest to your view? (%)
fight in

Mistake To Be There

Yes

Best Course of Action

No Op.

No

Greater

Earlier

Withdrawal Military
56
38

No
Opinion

National

74

22

Race
White
Black

73

22
23

5

55

1

63

39
33

4

19

3

55

42

3

Other

76
78

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly,

May

6
6

1990, 16.
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